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I. INTRODUCTION
Each year, countless scholars publish articles in law reviews 
across the country, hoping to have some impact on the way courts 
interpret and apply the law.  To have one’s labors approvingly cited or 
* Librarian Assistant Professor and Reference & Instructional Services
Librarian, University of Miami School of Law, Coral Gables, Florida; J.D., 2016, 
University of New Hampshire School of Law;  M.A. Library & Information Science, 
2017, University of Arizona.  My thanks to Connor M. Barry and Sarah-Marie 
Horning for their comments on a draft of this Essay. 
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discussed by a court is one of the highest compliments a legal scholar 
can receive.  Thus, it is the height of irony that judges have discussed 
or alluded to the works of novelist John Grisham—an attorney who 
has never authored a law review article—in over two dozen opinions.  
Ironic though it may be, it is not entirely unexpected, given that even 
the Harvard Law Review and the Index of Legal Periodicals are no 
match for Penguin Random House and the New York Times Bestsellers 
List.  While clerks skimming a database or flipping through bound 
volumes in the stacks of a law library can overlook an essay or a study, 
the tales of John Grisham, whether in paperback or on the silver screen, 
are difficult to escape.  But do Grisham’s legal thrillers have literary 
merit?  Are they suitable for inclusion in judicial opinions? 
The question of literary merit is a controversy that plagued the 
American university in the last years of the 20th century.  Following 
the 1987 publication of political philosopher Allan Bloom’s The 
Closing of the American Mind—a damning indictment of higher 
education for what Bloom saw as its intellectual and moral 
bankruptcy—a debate erupted in English departments about which 
authors properly belong in the canon:  those texts essential to attaining 
a liberal education.1  The traditionalists, Bloom’s allies, firmly 
believed that colleges and universities should teach only the “Great 
Books.”2 
Their opponents, the “cultural relativists,” many of whom 
witnessed or participated in the counterculture movement of the 1960s, 
were troubled by the fact that the canon consisted almost entirely of 
“dead white European males”; marching under the banners of 
1. Rachel Donadio, Essay, Revisiting the Canon Wars, N.Y. TIMES: BOOK 
REV. (Sept. 16, 2007), https://www.nytimes.com/2007/09/16/books/review/Donadio-
t.html.  The dissident feminist scholar Camille Paglia famously called Bloom’s book 




2. Bloom defines the “Great Books” as “certain generally recognized classic
texts.”  ALLAN BLOOM, THE CLOSING OF THE AMERICAN MIND 344 (1987).  Although 
he concedes to certain criticisms of this approach to education, he opines that “one 
thing is certain:  wherever the Great Books make up a central part of the curriculum, 
the students are excited and satisfied, feel they are doing something that is 
independent and fulfilling, getting something from the university they cannot get 
elsewhere.”  Id. 
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Marxism, critical theory, feminism, critical race theory, etc., they 
argued that these authors did not sufficiently represent the breadth of 
human experience.3  In some cases, they rejected the very notion of a 
universal human experience.4  For this reason, they insisted on 
including books written by women and racial minorities.5  The cultural 
relativists won this dispute, and English departments expanded reading 
lists accordingly.6 
Despite the decline of the traditional canon and the more 
expansive view of literature found on the contemporary university 
campus, the distinction between literary and genre fiction persists.7  
Whereas the first is said to be an artistic work that is difficult to 
classify, the latter easily falls into a genre and is thought to be written 
primarily for the purpose of entertainment and, thus, commercial 
success.8  These labels are complicated, however, when one considers 
3. See generally STEPHEN R.C. HICKS, EXPLAINING POSTMODERNISM: 
SKEPTICISM AND SOCIALISM FROM ROUSSEAU TO FOUCAULT 16–18 (2004). 
4. E.g., Rux Martin, Truth, Power, Self: An Interview with Michael Foucault, 
in TECHNOLOGIES OF THE SELF 9, 11 (Luther H. Martin et al. eds., 1988) (“All my 
analyses are against the idea of universal necessities in human existence.”); Richard 
Rorty, Unger, Castoriadis, and the Romance of a National Future, in 2 ESSAYS ON 
HEIDEGGER AND OTHERS: PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS 177, 189 (1991) (“[R]eason 
usually means working according to the rules of some familiar language-game, some 
familiar way of describing the current situation. . . . [S]uch familiar language games 
are themselves nothing more than frozen politics that they serve to legitimate, and 
make seem inevitable, precisely the forms of social life . . . from which we desperately 
hope to break free.” (quotations omitted)). 
5. Donadio, supra note 1.
6. Id.  See also NAT’L ASS’N OF SCHOLARS, LOSING THE BIG PICTURE: THE
FRAGMENTATION OF THE ENGLISH MAJOR SINCE 1964, at 78, 80 (2000), 
https://www.nas.org/images/documents/report_losing_the_big_picture.pdf (finding 
that in the 1964–1965 academic year the most read authors in college and university 
English classrooms were William Shakespeare, John Milton, Geoffrey Chaucer, John 
Dryden, Alexander Pope, and T.S. Elliot, whereas in the 1997–1998 academic year 
this same list consisted of William Shakespeare, Geoffrey Chaucer, Jane Austen, John 
Milton, Virginia Woolf, and Toni Morrison). 
7. See, e.g., Arthur Krystal, Easy Writers, NEW YORKER (May 28, 2012),
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2012/05/28/easy-writers; Stephen Marche, 
How Genre Fiction Became More Important than Literary Fiction, ESQUIRE (Mar. 
11, 2015), http://www.esquire.com/entertainment/books/a33599/genre-fiction-vs-
literary-fiction/. 
8. See generally Steve Petite, Literary Fiction vs. Genre Fiction,
HUFFINGTON POST, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/steven-petite/literary-fiction-vs-
734 The University of Memphis Law Review Vol. 48 
the participation of prominent authors of literary fiction in areas of 
genre fiction.  One thinks, for instance, of Margaret Atwood’s science 
fiction novels The Handmaid’s Tale (1985) and Oryx and Crake 
(2003). 
While those who hold to the use of these labels would surely 
characterize John Grisham’s legal thrillers as “genre fiction,” the 
consistent application of postmodernism—the pinnacle of which is 
deconstructionism9—invalidates privileging certain texts on the basis 
of this binary dichotomy.  As Professor Mary Beth Pringle has written 
on the scholarly treatment of Grisham’s works:  “postmodernism and, 
in particular, postmodern literary criticism have done much to break 
down barriers between so-called levels of fiction, occasionally 
showing detective and romance novels as well as fantasy fiction to be 
subtly epistemological texts.”10 
This is all well and good, but what of the judges?  Surely those 
who occupy the nation’s benches do not much care about the 
deconstruction of literary hierarchies or academic quarrels over which 
books belong on a course syllabus.  In recent years, however, a 
somewhat scholarly interest has developed in how judges use literature 
in judicial opinions and which authors they select.11  Unfortunately, 
genre-fiction_b_4859609.html (last updated Apr. 28, 2014), for a brief explanation of 
this proposition. 
9. See generally JACQUES DERRIDA, OF GRAMMATOLOGY (Gayatri
Chakravorty Spivak trans., Johns Hopkins Univ. Press 2016) (1967).  Derrida took 
his concept of deconstruction from Heidegger’s destruction. See MARTIN
HEIDEGGER, BEING AND TIME 44 (John Macquarrie & Edward Robinson trans., 
Harper & Row 1962) (1927) (“If the question of Being is to have its own history made 
transparent, then this hardened tradition must be loosened up, and the concealments 
which it has brought about must be dissolved.  We understand this task as one in 
which by taking the question of Being as our clue, we are to destroy the traditional 
content of ancient ontology until we arrive at those primordial experiences in which 
we achieved our first ways of determining the nature of Being—the ways which have 
guided us ever since.” (citation omitted)).  In the United States, Heidegger’s fellow 
Nazi partisan Paul de Man popularized deconstructionism.  See Carlin Romano, 
Deconstructing Paul de Man, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (Mar. 3, 2014), 
http://www.chronicle.com/article/Paul-de-Man-Deconstructed/144991. 
10. MARY BETH PRINGLE, REVISITING JOHN GRISHAM: A CRITICAL
COMPANION xvi (2007). 
11. Scott Dodson & Ami Dodson, Literary Justice, 18 GREEN BAG 2D 429,
429–34 (2015); M. Todd Henderson, Citing Fiction, 11 GREEN BAG 2D 171, 171–85 
(2008).  
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these empirical studies into the use of literature in judicial opinions 
have—either consciously or as a result of methodology—ignored those 
books outside the traditional canon. 
Despite this, there is nothing to suggest that judges have a 
closed view about which literature is acceptable for use in their 
opinions.  In Law & Literature, the most in-depth commentary we have 
by a jurist on the subject, Judge Richard A. Posner writes that 
“[p]opular novels about law . . . can profitably be studied as literature. 
John Grisham’s runaway bestsellers will illustrate, though they are 
unlikely to attain classic status.”12  Indeed, we are forced to accord 
cultural significance to Grisham’s novels and their film adaptions 
when we consider how they have served as a major source of exposure 
to the inner workings of the courtroom and the legal profession for 
countless Americans over the past three decades.13  Therefore, it 
should come as no surprise that judges have chosen to refer to 
Grisham’s novels. 
Perhaps this phenomenon indicates that judges also enjoy 
Grisham’s suspenseful accounts of lawyers and litigants faced with a 
system stacked against them from the outset.  It could also be that 
judges believe that analogizing to popular literature will make the law 
at hand easier to comprehend and their opinions more entertaining to 
read.14  Whether it points to a shared literature or an attempt by jurists 
to write more readable opinions, the results are surely encouraging for 
those who fear that the legal system grows increasingly alien to the 
average person.  It may be a small sign that judges have some 
12. RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW & LITERATURE 55 (3rd ed. 2009).  Indeed,
Posner’s main criticism of Grisham’s novels—and much more his early novels than 
his later ones—is not so much that they lack merit, but that they display a certain 
moral simplicity.  Id. 
13. For a discussion of the way media depictions of the law influence popular
perception of the same, see Victoria S. Salzmann & Philip T. Dunwoody, Prime-Time 
Lies: Do Portrayals of Lawyers Influence How People Think About the Legal 
Profession?, 58 SMU L. REV. 411 (2005); see also Lisa K. Dicker & Shane K. Hebel, 
The Litigators: Perceptions of Predictability, Definitions of a Good Outcome, and an 
Alternative to Mass Tort Trials, 48 U. MEM. L. REV. 987 (2018). 
14. For a discussion of references to popular culture as tools of persuasion in
legal rhetoric, specifically Grisham’s novels, see Victoria S. Salzmann, Honey, 
You’re Not June Cleaver: The Power of “Dropping Pop” to Persuade, 62 ME. L. 
REV. 241, 256–57 (2010). 
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conception of the cultural lens through which the public views their 
profession. 
Of course, all of this raises the embarrassing question of 
whether the law is upstream or downstream of culture.  Do judges hand 
down law that informs culture, or does culture mold judges who 
remake law in its image?  This modest bibliographical study does not 
seek to answer such a difficult and troubling philosophical question, 
but merely explicates the phenomenon so that readers can draw their 
own conclusions about why judges use literature and, more 
specifically, Grisham’s legal thrillers. 
This study begins with an explanation of methodology and an 
annotated bibliography of the results.  Next, the author discusses the 
various ways that courts have used Grisham’s works, categorizing each 
case according to its function.  The author concludes with further 
speculation about why judges are drawn to Grisham’s novels. 
II. METHODOLOGY
The author searched for “John Grisham” in cases across several 
commercial databases.  These searches included both state and federal 
courts in all United States jurisdictions.  The author then examined the 
yield and retained only cases in which the judge unilaterally used some 
part of the Grisham corpus as a literary tool according to Henderson’s 
definition.15  The study preserves the remaining cases as annotated for 
context. 
15. In his article Citing Fiction, M. Todd Henderson defines a literary tool as
an instance “where the author’s name, the title of a book, or . . . a quote or idea[] is 
used to evoke an image that helps color the argument.”  Henderson, supra note 11, at 
174.
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III. ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY
A. Federal Courts
1. U.S. Courts of Appeals
United States v. Erpenbeck (6th Cir. 2012)16 
Judge Jeffrey Sutton characterizes a case in which the 
FBI discovered over $250,000 in a cooler buried on a 
private golf course as having “a fact pattern befitting 
a John Grisham novel.”17 
Roth v. U.S. Department of Justice (D.C. Cir. 2011)18 
This case involves a FOIA request brought by an 
attorney who believes that the Department of Justice 
possesses files about his death-row client that might 
lead to exoneration.  Judge David S. Tatel cites The 
Confession (2010) as an example of media interest in 
the exoneration of inmates on death row.19 
Living Designs, Inc. v. E.I. Dupont de Nemmours and 
Co. (9th Cir. 2005)20 
In this case, the plaintiffs bring a Racketeer 
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”) 
claim alleging that law firms employed by a fungicide 
corporation were an enterprise of that entity.  Chief 
Judge Sidney Runyan Thomas writes that the 
plaintiffs are “taking a page out of a John Grisham 
novel,” alluding to The Firm (1991).21 
16. United States v. Erpenbeck, 682 F.3d 472 (6th Cir. 2012).
17. Id. at 474.
18. Roth v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 642 F.3d 1161 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
19. Id. at 1176.
20. Living Designs, Inc. v. E.I. Dupont de Nemours & Co., 431 F.3d 353 (9th
Cir. 2005). 
21. Id. at 361 n.6.
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Campbell v. Citizens for an Honest Government, Inc. 
(8th Cir. 2001)22 
Judge C. Arlen Beam writes that the record in this 
case, in which two law enforcement officers brought 
a defamation claim against the producer of a video 
that implicated them in the deaths of two teenage 
boys, “reads like a John Grisham novel.”23 
Vining on Behalf of Vining v. Enterprise Financial 
Group, Inc. (10th Cir. 1998)24 
In a footnote, Judge David M. Ebel compares 
defendant insurance company’s conduct and loss 
ratios “to those of the fictional insurance company 
portrayed in John Grisham’s novel The Rainmaker 
and in the motion picture of the same name.”25 
Figueroa v. Rivera (1st Cir. 1998)26 
In a case in which family members of an inmate who 
died while incarcerated brought a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 
action alleging that the prison in which he was 
residing had framed him for murder and failed to 
provide him with adequate medical care, Judge Bruce 
M. Selya writes that “the complaint would seem to
have been lifted from the pages of a John Grisham
thriller.”27
22. Campbell v. Citizens for an Honest Gov’t, Inc., 255 F.3d 560 (8th Cir.
2001). 
23. Id. at 563.
24. Vining ex rel. Vining v. Enter. Fin. Grp., Inc., 148 F.3d 1206 (10th Cir.
1998). 
25. Id. at 1212 n.4.
26. Figueroa v. Rivera, 147 F.3d 77 (1st Cir. 1998).
27. Id. at 79.
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2. U.S. District Courts
Van Stelton v. Van Stelton (N.D. Iowa 2013)28 
Judge Mark W. Bennett writes that the plaintiff’s 
complaint “reads like a literary mashup of John 
Grisham’s novel, ‘the Firm,’ and John Steinbeck’s 
‘East of Eden,”29 in that the complaint included 
allegations of a powerful law firm involved in 
organized crime and a conflict between brothers over 
their interests in a family trust. 
United States v. ITT Educational Services, Inc. (S.D. 
Ind. 2012)30 
In this action for attorney’s fees and sanctions, Judge 
Tanya Walton Pratt opines that the attorney’s actions 
at issue, namely trolling public dockets and 
employing a private investigator to cold-call potential 
plaintiffs who had previously sued the defendant, “are 
far worse than the garden-variety ‘ambulance 
chasing’—seen in movies and read about in John 
Grisham novels—that gives the public a negative 
perception of the legal profession.”31 
Bagsby v. Gehres (E.D. Mich. 2005)32 
In introducing a dispute over assets between two 
attorneys who married, divorced, reconciled, and 
separated again, Magistrate Judge Charles S. Binder 
laments that, “Some cases are the stuff of John 
28. Van Stelton v. Van Stelton, No. C11-4045-MWB, 2013 WL 3776813
(N.D. Iowa July 17, 2013). 
29. Id. at *1.
30. United States v. ITT Educ. Servs., Inc., No. 1:07-cv-0887-TWP-MJD,
2012 WL 1028794 (S.D. Ind. Mar. 26, 2012). 
31. Id. at *13.
32. Bagsby v. Gehres, No. 00-CV-10153-BC, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13115
(E.D. Mich. Feb. 16, 2005). 
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Grisham.  Some cases are the stuff of Greek tragedies, 
or possibly Norse sagas.”33 
International Tobacco Partners, Ltd. v. Beebe (W.D. 
Ark. 2006)34 
In a lawsuit brought by a tobacco importer against the 
Attorney General of Arkansas assailing the allocable 
share amendment in the state’s escrow and contraband 
statutes, Judge Jimm Larry Hendren complains that 
“the Amended Complaint is 37 pages long, and reads 
like a John Grisham novel.”35 
United States v. Kouri-Perez (D.P.R. 1997)36 
Here, the defendant filed a motion to disqualify a 
prosecutor and her assistant because defense 
counsel’s assistant told the prosecutor’s assistant that 
a codefendant had arranged to pay some of the 
defendant’s legal expenses.  Judge José A. Fusté 
writes that the defendant’s “motion builds on the 
quicksands of distortion to present a portrait of 
deviousness that recalls a John Grisham novel, rather 
than the facts of this case.”37 
Burge v. Parish of St. Tammany (E.D. La. 1997)38 
Judge Marcel Livaudais Jr. describes a set of facts 
recounting the investigation of a murder, the trial and 
conviction of the plaintiff for that murder, and his 
subsequent acquittal in a retrial as “bear[ing] some 
resemblance to a John Grisham novel.”39 
33. Id. at *2.
34. Int’l Tobacco Partners, Ltd. v. Beebe, 420 F. Supp. 2d 989 (W.D. Ark.
2006). 
35. Id. at 992.
36. United States v. Kouri-Perez, 992 F. Supp. 511 (D.P.R. 1997).
37. Id. at 512.
38. Burge v. Parish of St. Tammany, No. 91-2321, 1997 WL 10243 (E.D. La.
Jan. 8, 1997). 
39. Id. at *1.
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Krieger v. Adler, Kaplan & Begy (E.D. Ill. 1996)40 
In a wrongful termination suit brought against a law 
firm, Judge Harry Leinenweber writes that the 
plaintiff’s complaint reads “more like a John Grisham 
novel than an acceptable initial pleading.”41 
B. State Courts
1. State Supreme Courts
Hall v. Elected Officials’ Retirement Plan (Ariz. 
2016)42
Justice Clint Bolick refers to a judicially-constructed 
implied contract between the state and elected state 
officials for pension benefits as “a work of legal 
fiction to which the likes of John Grisham could only 
aspire.”43 
Artiga-Morales v. State (Nev. 2014)44 
In a dissent, Associate Justice Michael A. Cherry 
decries the inherent unfairness of not requiring 
prosecutors to disclose veniremember information to 
defense counsel.45  He expresses worry that failing to 
do so will result in unintended consequences, such as 
“the use of a ‘war room’ [similar to the one] that is 
portrayed in John Grisham’s book and movie 
Runaway Jury.”46 
40. Krieger v. Adler, Kaplan & Begy, No. 94 C 7809, 1996 WL 6540 (N.D.
Ill. Jan. 5, 1996). 
41. Id. at *1.
42. Hall v. Elected Officials’ Ret. Plan, 383 P.3d 1107 (Ariz. 2016).
43. Id. at 1123 (Bolick, J., dissenting).
44. Artiga-Morales v. State, 335 P.3d 179 (Nev. 2014).
45. Id. at 182 (Cherry, J., dissenting).
46. Id. at 183.
742 The University of Memphis Law Review Vol. 48 
State v. Schaefer (Wis. 2008)47 
In this opinion, the majority found that a defendant 
does not possess a right to compel production of 
police reports because there is no “enforceable right 
to subpoena police investigation reports and 
nonprivileged materials before a preliminary 
examination.”48  In a concurring opinion, Chief 
Justice Shirley S. Abrahamson argues that the 
majority “errs in musing that law enforcement and the 
district attorney perhaps may be treated as one.”49  In 
a footnote, she adds:  
Law enforcement’s task is to objectively gather all 
the evidence in pursuit of the truth, rather than to 
attempt to hone in early on a suspect and build a 
case against him or her. . . . [P]remature 
concentration on one suspect, has been shown to 
lead to wrongful convictions.  For a chilling non-
fiction description of non-objective police 
investigation resulting in an innocent person being 
convicted and sentenced to death, see John 
Grisham, The Innocent Man (2006).50 
State v. McCoy (Iowa 2007)51 
Following the reversal of a conviction for first-degree 
murder, the exonerated defendant applied to the court 
requesting a determination that he was wrongfully 
imprisoned and, therefore, entitled to compensation. 
Writing for the majority, Justice Mark S. Cady found 
that “the crux of the right to seek recovery as a 
wrongfully imprisoned person [under Iowa’s 
wrongful imprisonment statute] is the . . . finding that 
47. State v. Schaefer, 746 N.W.2d 457 (Wis. 2008).
48. Id. at 481.
49. Id. at 487 (Abrahamson, C.J., concurring).
50. Id. at 487 n.34 (Abrahamson, C.J., concurring) (citation omitted).
51. State v. McCoy, 742 N.W.2d 593 (Iowa 2007).
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requires the person to be an ‘innocent man’ or 
woman.”52  In a footnote Justice Cady adds:  
“The Innocent Man” is the title of a book by John 
Grisham that chronicles the life of a wrongfully 
imprisoned person, Ron Williamson, in the State of 
Oklahoma.  Williamson was eventually exonerated 
by DNA evidence after serving 11 years of 
incarceration on death row following his conviction 
for capital murder in 1988.  He died in 2004, an 
innocent man.53 
Charles J. Vacanti, M.D., Inc. v. State Compensation 
Insurance Fund (Cal. 2001)54 
In an action brought by a group of medical providers 
against a group of workers’ compensation insurers, 
Associate Justice Janice Rogers Brown compares a 
scheme to put plaintiff medical providers out of 
business by “delaying payment or refusing to pay for 
services rendered by plaintiffs to injured workers”55 
with “the methods used by Great Benefit Insurance 
Company, the villain in the John Grisham thriller, The 
Rainmaker (Doubleday, 1995).”56 
Cantley v. Lorillard Tobacco Co. (Ala. 1996)57 
The plaintiff, the administrator of the estate of a 
smoker who died of cancer, sued defendant cigarette 
manufacturers claiming fraudulent suppression and 
design defect.  Defendant filed for summary judgment 
on preemption grounds.58  Finding that the fraudulent 
suppression claim was preempted while the design 
52. Id. at 597.
53. Id. at 597 n.3.
54. Charles J. Vacanti, M.D., Inc. v. State Comp. Ins. Fund, 14 P.3d 234 (Cal.
2001). 
55. Id. at 241.
56. Id.
57. Cantley v. Lorillard Tobacco Co., 681 So. 2d 1057 (Ala. 1996).
58. Id. at 1059.
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defect claim was not, Justice J. Gorman Houston Jr. 
of the Alabama Supreme Court writes in a footnote 
that “[t]his opinion deals with a subject of great 
current interest, both in fact . . . and in fiction (see, 
e.g., John Grisham, The Runaway Jury . . . ).”59
Dycus v. Sillers (Miss. 1990)60 
This “case about a fishin’ hole”61—more specifically 
about the public’s right to ingress and egress to a 
crevasse—is laden with literary imagery.  The court 
quoted passages from Grisham’s A Time to Kill62 
alongside the works of Mark Twain,63 William 
Faulkner,64 Eudora Welty,65 and Walter Percy,66 
among others.  The author of the opinion, Justice 
James L. Robertson, employs the Grisham passages to 
describe life in rural Mississippi and how a lake 
changes with the seasons.67 
2. State Intermediate Appellate Courts
R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Allen (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
2017)68
In an appeal brought by defendant tobacco company 
alleging juror misconduct, Judge Ross L. Bilbrey 
contrasts the facts of the present case against the plot 
of Runaway Jury (1996).  He writes: 
59. Id. at 1059 n.2.
60. Dycus v. Sillers, 557 So.2d 486 (Miss. 1990).
61. Id. at 487.
62. Id. at 491 n.47.
63. Id. at 490 n.33.
64. Id. at 488 nn.13 & 17.
65. Id. at 487 nn.4 & 6, 491 n.50.
66. Id. at 488 nn.10 & 15, 489 n.20.
67. Id. at 492 n.55.
68. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Allen, 228 So. 3d 684 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2017). 
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If Mr. Taylor had intended to be a stealth juror 
leading a runaway jury, he did a poor job of 
concealing it by providing answers in the 
questionnaire that he was a 28-year former smoker 
now “clean” for five years, mentioning his many 
attempts to quit smoking, and acknowledging his 
family members who smoked or who he believed 
were adversely affected by smoking.  Cf.  John 
Grisham, The Runaway Jury (1996) (a work of 
fiction where a prospective juror actively hid his 
past and hid strongly held beliefs in order to be 
selected as a juror and influence a substantial 
verdict against a tobacco company).69 
Garcia v. Commonwealth (Va. Ct. App. 2012)70 
On appeal, defendant alleges that a biased juror 
prejudiced the case against him.  Judge Stephen R. 
McCullough writes that “[p]opular movies and fiction 
at times depict jurors being approached by persons 
who seek to influence their deliberations—a rare 
circumstance in actuality, but one that laypersons 
unfamiliar with the legal system easily might 
misapprehend.”71  In a corresponding footnote he 
elaborates:  “For example, in the novel and movie 
Runaway Jury, by bestselling author John Grisham, 
members of the jury in a high profile case are 
subjected to attempts at bribery and blackmail.”72 
Picozzi v. Miller (Cal. Ct. App. 2008)73 
In a case involving a law firm, sexual harassment 
allegations, false charges, and the overbilling of a 
state agency, Presiding Justice David G. Sills 
comments that these facts are “the makings of a plot 
69. Id. at 688 n.3.
70. Garcia v. Commonwealth, 726 S.E.2d 359 (Va. Ct. App. 2012).
71. Id. at 363.
72. Id. at 363 n.3.
73. Picozzi v. Miller, No. G038627, 2008 WL 2487868, at *1 (Cal. Ct. App.
June 23, 2008). 
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involving law firm intrigue worthy of John 
Grisham . . . .”74 
Herring v. Bocquet (Tex. Ct. App. 1996)75 
In a dispute over attorney’s fees—especially those 
fees generated through in-house conferences—Justice 
Phillip D. Hardberger reproduces a passage about “the 
art of billing” from The Rainmaker (1995) to illustrate 
that conferences are “a part of the fabric of the law.” 
He goes on to say that “Grisham’s quote implies 
potential abuse of conferences, and no doubt it 
happens.  The more common problem though is that 
the conference, while well-meaning, turns out to be 
useless:  nothing accomplished.”76 
3. State District Courts
Chase v. Burlington Northern Santa Fe Corp. (Minn. 
Dist. Ct. 2009)77 
In a court order granting in part and denying in part 
plaintiff’s motion to impose sanctions upon defendant 
for, among other things, “the loss, destruction, and/or 
alteration of critical evidence, misrepresentations . . . 
and the general obstruction of Plaintiffs’ ability to 
prosecute their case,”78 Judge Ellen L. Maas writes 
that “Plaintiffs contend that [defendant] engaged in a 
systematic exploitation of the civil-justice system of a 
pervasiveness seldom seen outside of John Grisham 
novels.”79 
74. Id. at *1.
75. Herring v. Bocquet, 933 S.W.2d 611 (Tex. Ct. App. 1996).
76. Id. at 614–15.
77. Chase v. Burlington N. Santa Fe Corp., Nos. C4-05-1607, C2-03-10995,
02-C0-04-10312, C1-06-10212, 2009 WL 6356932, at *1 (Minn. Dist. Ct. Oct. 15, 
2009) (mem.). 
78. Id. at *3.
79. Id.
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IV. ANALYSIS
Comparing the above cases, we can group them according to 
how they interact with the Grisham corpus.  In doing so, three distinct 
categories arise:  (1) John Grisham qua brand; (2) acts of intertextuality 
in which the text of the opinion relies upon the text of one of Grisham’s 
legal thrillers; and (3) citation to one of Grisham’s novels as an 
authority to be considered.  The following section discusses the cases 
in each of these categories. 
A. Brand
One potential methodological criticism of this Essay is that 
even the most superficial mentions of Grisham and his works appear 
in the study’s bibliography.  This recognizes, however, that the advent 
of a pop-culture reference to a figure or work can tell us more about its 
influence than a detailed recitation of its attributes.  As Grisham 
himself told The Guardian in a November 2011 interview, “My name 
became a brand and I’d love to say it was the plan from the start . . . 
but the only plan was to keep writing books.”80 
Accordingly, judges have used Grisham’s name as a synonym 
for the legal thriller and have done so in a variety of formulations:  “a 
fact pattern befitting a John Grisham novel,”81 “reads like a John 
Grisham novel,”82  “the complaint would seem to have been lifted from 
the pages of a John Grisham thriller,”83 “far worse than the garden-
variety ‘ambulance chasing’—seen in movies and read about in John 
Grisham novels,”84 “some cases are the stuff of John Grisham,”85 “the 
Amended Complaint is 37 pages long, and reads like a John Grisham 
80. Nicholas Wroe, A Life in Writing: John Grisham, THE GUARDIAN (Nov.
25, 2011), https://www.theguardian.com/culture/2011/nov/25/john-grisham-life-in-
writing. 
81. United States v. Erpenbeck, 682 F.3d 472, 474 (6th Cir. 2012).
82. Campbell v. Citizens for an Honest Gov’t, Inc., 255 F.3d 560, 563 (8th
Cir. 2001). 
83. Figueroa v. Rivera, 147 F.3d 77, 79 (1st Cir. 1998).
84. United States v. ITT Educ. Servs., Inc., No. 1:07-cv-0887-TWP-MJD,
2012 WL 1028794, at *13 (S.D. Ind. Mar. 26, 2012). 
85. Bagsby v. Gehres, No. 00-CV-10153-BC, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13115,
at *2 (E.D. Mich. Feb. 16, 2005). 
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novel,”86 “a portrait of deviousness that recalls a John Grisham 
novel,”87 “bear[ing] some resemblance to a John Grisham novel,”88 
“more like a John Grisham novel than an acceptable initial pleading,”89 
“a work of legal fiction to which the likes of John Grisham could only 
aspire,” 90 “the making of a plot involving law firm intrigue worthy of 
John Grisham,”91 and “systematic exploitation of the civil-justice 
system of a pervasiveness seldom seen outside of John Grisham 
novels.”92  In almost all of these cases, however, the purpose is the 
same:  critiquing or mocking the melodramatic elements of the facts at 
bar. 
B. Intertextuality
More interesting to those intrigued with deciphering how judges 
think about literature are those cases which share an intertextual 
relationship with one of Grisham’s books—those cases in which the 
judge relies on one of Grisham’s legal thrillers to create meaning in a 
way that is not merely superficial. 
First, there are instances of direct quotation such as that found 
in Dycus v. Sillers,93 a masterpiece of literature in law94 that—in 
addition to quoting passages from Grisham’s A Time to Kill (1989) to 
describe the life and landscape of rural Mississippi—quotes from, 
among others:  Mark Twain’s Huckleberry Finn (1885); William 
86. Int’l Tobacco Partners, Ltd., v. Beebe, 420 F. Supp. 2d 989, 992 (W.D.
Ark. 2006). 
87. United States v. Kouri-Perez, 992 F. Supp. 511, 512 (D.P.R. 1997).
88. Burge v. Parish of St. Tammany, No. 91-2321, 1997 WL 10243, at *1
(E.D. La. Jan. 8, 1997). 
89. Krieger v. Adler, Kaplan & Begy, No. 94 C 7809, 1996 WL 6540, at *1
(N.D. Ill. Jan. 5, 1996). 
90. Hall v. Elected Officials’ Ret. Plan, 383 P.3d 1107, 1123 (Ariz.  2016).
91. Picozzi v. Miller, No. G038627, 2008 WL 2487868, at *1 (Cal. Ct. App.
June 23, 2008). 
92. Chase v. Burlington N. Santa Fe Corp., Nos. C4-05-1607, C2-03-10995,
02-C0-04-10312, C1-06-10212, 2009 WL 6356932, at *1 (Minn. Dist. Ct. Oct. 15, 
2009) (mem.). 
93. 557 So. 2d 486, 491 n.47, 492 n.50 (Miss. 1990).
94. Indeed, it calls to mind the famous “Ghostbusters ruling” assigned in
contracts, property, and law & literature courses across the country each year. 
Stambovsky v. Ackley, 169 A.D.2d 254 (N.Y. App. Div. 1991). 
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Faulkner’s Go Down, Moses (1942) and The Reivers (1962); Eudora 
Welty’s Losing Battles (1970) and Collected Stories (1980); and 
Walter Percy’s The Moviegoer (1961) and The Last Gentleman (1966). 
Another example appears in Herring v. Bocquet,95 in which the court 
uses a passage from The Rainmaker (1995) about the incessant 
presence of conferences in litigation to illustrate the pervasiveness of 
the problem. 
Next, there are cases like Vining on Behalf of Vining v. 
Enterprise Financial Group, Inc.96 and Charles J. Vacanti, M.D., Inc. 
v. State Comp. Ins. Fund,97 which incorporate Grisham’s works by
reference.  In these cases, the purpose is to compare the dubious
practices of the insurer that is party to the suit with the actions of
“Great Benefit Insurance Company,” the villain in the John Grisham
thriller, The Rainmaker (1995).98  Another example surfaces in Artiga-
Morales v. State99 where the war room featured in Runaway Jury
(1996) is adduced to warn against the negative consequences of
allowing prosecutors to withhold disclosure of veniremember
information from defense counsel.
Finally, there is the passing footnote or aside, usually to draw 
attention to the fact that the issue before the court has received a great 
deal of attention in popular culture, for example, “[t]his opinion deals 
with a subject of great current interest, both in fact . . . and in fiction 
(see, e.g., John Grisham, The Runaway Jury . . . ).”100 
C. Authority
In a handful of cases, courts cite Grisham’s books as persuasive 
authority.  In Roth v. U.S. Department of Justice,101 State v. 
Schaefer,102 and State v. McCoy,103 courts discuss or cite The Innocent 
95. 933 S.W.2d 611, 614 (Tex. App. 1996).
96. 148 F.3d 1206, 1212 (10th Cir. 1998).
97. 14 P.3d 234, 241 (Cal. 2001).
98. See Vining, 148 F.3d at 1212; Charles J. Vacanti, M.D., Inc., 14 P.3d at
241. 
99. 335 P.3d 179 (Nev. 2014).
100. Cantley v. Lorillard Tobacco Co., Inc., 681 So.2d 1057, 1059 (Ala. 1996).
101. 642 F.3d 1161, 1176 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
102. 746 N.W.2d 457, 487 (Wis. 2008).
103. 742 N.W.2d 593, 596 (Iowa 2007).
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Man: Murder and Injustice in a Small Town (2006) in the context of 
the need for safeguards against the breakdown of the justice system 
leading to the conviction of an innocent person. 
The more interesting example in this category, however, is R.J. 
Reynolds Tobacco Company v. Allen,104 a case about juror misconduct 
in which Judge Ross L. Bilbrey distinguishes the facts at bar from the 
plot of The Runaway Jury (1996).  On this basis, among others, he 
determines that juror misconduct has not occurred because the juror in 
question did not conceal his bias in the jury questionnaire as happened 
in Grisham’s novel. 
V. CONCLUSION
What do we make of these cases and the various ways judges 
have used Grisham’s legal thrillers?  Perhaps Grisham’s presence in 
some of these instances has served to “humanize the law.”  Such was 
the original aim of the law and humanities movement, a subset of 
which is the study of law and literature.105 
While Grisham himself would surely reject comparison to the 
literary figures typically cited and discussed in this area of study, there 
can be no doubt that his tales have a strong moral component which 
might serve as a “compass” to guide lawyers, as Judge John B. Owens 
104. No. 1D15–4197, 2017 WL 729817 (Fla. Ct. App. Feb. 24, 2017).
105. See, e.g., Guido Calabresi, Introductory Letter, 1 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. vii
(1988); Roscoe Pound, The Humanities in an Absolutist World, 39 CLASSICAL J. 203 
(1943).  But see Austin Sarat, Matthew Anderson, & Catherine O. Frank, Introduction 
to LAW AND THE HUMANITIES: AN INTRODUCTION 11 (Austin Sarat et al. eds., 2010) 
(“Today . . . critical impulses abound, not looking to save or humanize law or lawyers, 
but to expose the hidden assumptions that structure their work, the values that 
privilege some views and silence others, the identities that law privileges and those it 
pushes to the margins and, in doing so, to call law and lawyers to account.”).  Yet, is 
this objective not the very thing critical legal studies (“CLS”) has already sought to 
accomplish?  Does not the “critical impulse” suffer from its own messianic complex, 
its own tendency to see itself as a savior of the law and those affected by it?  If law 
and the humanities has become nothing more than CLS with a literary flare, what 
unique contribution does it make?  Perhaps a shift to the view, articulated by Stanley 
Fish, that “it is not the business of the humanities to save us” and that “[t]he 
humanities are their own good” would serve to revitalize the field and draw the legal 
community’s attention to it.  Stanley Fish, Will the Humanities Save Us?, N.Y. TIMES: 
OPINIONATOR (Jan. 6, 2008, 5:31 PM), 
https://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/01/06/will-the-humanities-save-us/. 
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of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit suggested well 
before he was appointed to the bench.106  It could be, as Professor 
William H. Simon has suggested, that this is because Grisham’s 
characters possess “[m]oral [p]luck,” “a combination of transgression 
and resourcefulness in the vindication of justice”107 that stands in sharp 
contrast with “the authoritarianism of Conformist Moralism.”108 
Whatever the case, there can be no doubt that Grisham has 
broad appeal in the legal profession.  Of course, Grisham has his 
political biases.  His novels display strong opposition to capital 
punishment and tort reform, while the legal community has long been 
divided on these issues.  His characters, however, speak to that element 
inside every lawyer, that initial motivation for studying the law, which 
loves justice—whether in the form of social change or the restoration 
of an old order—and desires more than anything to be that protagonist 
who faces off with ‘the system’ and prevails. 
106. John B. Owens, Grisham’s Legal Tales: A Moral Compass for the Young
Lawyer, 48 UCLA L. REV. 1431, 1431 (2001). 
107. William H. Simon, Moral Pluck: Legal Ethics in Popular Culture, 101
COLUM. L. REV. 421, 422 (2001). 
108. Id. at 425.
